Post-conflict police reconstruction: Major trends and developments

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Abstract
Scholars have established effective and impartial policing regimes that are central to the development and maintenance of democratic states, especially in post-conflict scenarios as the international community attempts to rebuild nations in the wake of dictatorial rule. Yet despite how common such efforts are, there remain serious gaps in the academic literature regarding this central aspect of state reconstruction. Recognizing that the model which is most commonly employed in practice is woefully insufficient, scholars have begun to coalesce around a newer, more reflexive approach toward police reconstruction which more seriously grapples with the many political, economic, and social questions inherent to such efforts. However, despite this growth of the field, there remain significant gaps in the literature, especially around personnel recruitment and resource allocation. This article offers an explanation of these two models of post-conflict police reconstruction, while explicating the remaining gaps in our collective knowledge.

1 POLICING AND THE STATE

Effective post-conflict state reconstruction is by necessity a complicated affair. One oft-overlooked central aspect of state reconstruction programs is the successful and timely introduction of new policing regimes. In the past two decades, international coalitions have attempted to reconstruct police forces in well over a dozen nations (Dobbins, 2004). Although the results of these efforts have been mixed, they have left us with a wealth of scholarly materials concerning the practical and theoretical aspects of police reconstruction (Bayley & Perito, 2010; Ellison & Pino, 2012; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Murray, 2011; Wisler, 2007).

Practically, police contribute to the social order and security necessary for day-to-day life. Theoretically, police are integral to the state’s assertion of sovereignty over law and social order, a fundamental basis of the establishment of legitimate democratic rule and the modern nation-state (Garland, 2001; Simon, 2007). The criminal justice system...
has been employed for “little bursts of state-making” (Gottschalk, 2006), as the modern state has used the criminalization of large swaths of behavior to expand its power to control normative order. Tilly (1990) famously demonstrates how the nation-states of Europe were consolidated in large part through the provision of internal security and the wider claim to defining and maintaining social order.

The central role of policing to successful state building stems from the two fundamental needs of the modern democratic state: legitimacy, in the eyes of citizens and other nations, and effectiveness, in terms of services rendered (Call, 2011). Importantly, legitimacy has been found to be highly dependent upon the effective delivery of services, especially safety and security, in post-conflict nations (Bradford, Murphy, & Jackson, 2014; Hills, 2014; Jackson, Asif, Bradford, & Zakria Zakar, 2014). However, this is not to discount the important role legitimacy and public trust play in post-conflict reconstruction; policing is highly dependent on public support, as their ability to investigate crimes and locate and apprehend those who have broken the law rests on information supplied to them by members of the public (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Thus, even if police have the capacity to provide effective services, they are unable to do so without at least some level of legitimacy. This is an especially germane consideration in post-conflict environments, as often police were integral to the abuses of the prior regime, leaving the population especially wary of police actions (Cohen & Nordås, 2014; Wozniak, 2017a). Issues of legitimacy and effectiveness are therefore highly intertwined, requiring more holistic considerations of how the two interact and build upon one another (Ellison, 2007). Finally, the federalist democracy favored by the international community in reconstruction efforts requires not only stability, but consensus between multiple ethnic, religious, and cultural groups (Allen, 2010; Nuruzzaman, 2010).

Police are central to all of these processes, as they are famously the actors in a democratic society with the legitimate monopoly on the domestic use of force, giving them a central role in the maintenance of social order. Police perform a number of important symbolic and material functions, and while many other social actors can provide these, few other than a publicly accountable force are able to bring them together in the legitimized manner necessary for a constitutional democracy (Bradford et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2014; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). Especially in post-conflict and state reconstruction scenarios, police play a central role in providing social stability (Bayley & Perito, 2010; Jackson et al., 2014; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010) seeing as they are the “key component that connects the democratic framework to ensure sustainable development, democracy, peace, and security” (Den Heyer, 2010: 214).

However, democratic policing is essential not only for the provision of security and stability but also for building public trust in the state and its representatives, as “few such agents are more active, numerous, or potentially intimidating than police officers” (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010: 80). As such visible public agents, police “show in concrete terms for whom and in what matter governmental power will be used” (Bayley & Perito, 2010: 152), with the strength of a democracy and the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens in large part due to the ability of police to effectively and legitimately discharge their duties (Bradford et al., 2014).

In the following sections, I lay out the major schools of thought concerning the ideologies and best practices suggested by the literature on police reconstructing. First is a discussion of the oldest and most widely employed model of police reconstruction, which suffers from a number of fundamental flaws both practically and theoretically. This is followed by an analysis of newer, more reflexive approaches to police reconstruction which, while a marked improvement over the classic model, still suffer from several fundamental problems, most notably a lack of attention paid to issues of funding and personnel recruitment. Finally, it is argued that the literature on this subject remains underdeveloped and in need of both longitudinal studies of previous efforts as well as bottom-up understandings of the day-to-day realities of police reconstruction.

2 | THE CLASSICAL MODEL

The most widely employed model of police reconstruction has changed relatively little over the past several decades. At its core, it views reconstruction efforts as principally technical enterprises of importing Western
methods while improving capacity through training by Western advisors. In this model, training is typically one part of a larger neoliberal program (Wozniak, 2017b) resting on stark political and economic liberalization, largely ignoring variance in local conditions, such as previous forms of government or current levels of violence (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Roberts, 2011). The work of Bayley (2006) fits neatly within this paradigm, identifying what he terms four pivotal reforms for democratic forces, arguing police must be accountable to law rather than a particular government; must protect human rights; must be accountable to persons outside the force; and finally, must give priority to the needs of private citizens.

A central problem of this classical approach is that in practice transnational police reconstruction often suffers from a black-and-white world view (William & Sheptycki, 2007) which doesn't fully grapple with the various complexities inherent to each new situation (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). In many ways, these schema are comparable to what Corbett and Marx (1991) label the “technofallacy” of American policing; that is, the assumption that simply giving police better technology and organizational methods will result in improved policing. One striking example of this failure to consider contextual issues beyond technical and organizational considerations is the level of recruits typically attracted by these restructured police forces.

The importance of well-qualified, educated, and trained recruits is a staple of the literature on police reconstruction (Bayley & Perito, 2010; Ellison & Pino, 2012; Neild, 2001). Not only should recruits have high academic standards and thorough training, it is a widely held consensus that the newly established force have few, if any, officers from the previous regime (Baker, 2007; Bayley, 2006; Den Heyer, 2010). Yet in practice, many efforts have instead problematically focused on immediate quantity over long-term quality, recycling officers from the old regime and accepting recruits well-below acceptable standards, despite the fact that it has been well-documented that a rush to have officers on the street as soon as possible leads to significant problems with corruption, brutality, and police who are either unable or unwilling (or both) to perform the functions necessary to maintain democratic order (Bradford et al., 2014; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

Surprisingly, despite the reoccurring problem of underqualified recruits in police reconstruction efforts around the globe, there is scant scientific literature on the issue of personnel recruitment (Haarr, 2005). This is notable as multiple scholars have found that in these situations many are drawn to policing simply for the chance at a paycheck and an opportunity to escape the dire economy which is nearly always a feature of post-conflict societies. Wozniak (2017a) demonstrates how Iraqi police express little interest in the job, and many speak openly about having joined only because they were desperate for work, while others have reported similar processes in places such as Sierra Leone (Keen, 2005) and Afghanistan (Murray, 2011).

These issues are important beyond the obvious problem of police forces comprised of personnel who have little interest in being police, as it reveals that while these reconstructed forces are ostensibly comprised of willing volunteers, they are much better understood as economically conscripted. This is quite significant as the literature on military conscription finds such forces have significantly higher turnover rates, which are associated with "less training and lower motivation" (Adam, 2012: 717) as well as strongly incentivizing corruption and other illicit behaviors (Celador, 2005; Den Heyer, 2010). Such frequent turnover leads to an ineffectual force, due to having to continually train replacements, the acceptance of poor recruits, and significantly underprepared personnel (Cortright, 1975; Lingle, 1989). While these findings are all from studies regarding military conscription, the fact that such problems bear a striking resemblance to problems commonly experienced by post-conflict police forces (Murray, 2011; SIGIR, 2013; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010; Wozniak, 2017b) indicates that their economic conscription is having much the same effect.

Another major problematic assumption of the classical model of police reconstruction is how it assumes that new recruits to the police force identify with the state and new government and see policing as a legitimate institution, despite this often not being the case (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006; Johnathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Wozniak, 2017a). Indeed, it would likely be more effective to assume just the opposite, as typically the reason a police force is undergoing reconstruction is due to the state’s emergence from a totalitarian, dictatorial, or otherwise illegitimate and distrusted government. As such, until the new government is able to establish some level of effectiveness and
legitimacy, there are extremely few motivations for "sub-state groups to shift allegiance and salience of identity to the national level" (Allen, 2010: 423).

Beyond their lack of identification with the nation-state, there is also a significant amount of evidence that many recruits in post-conflict situations don't see the police force itself as a legitimate institution (Keen, 2005; Murray, 2011; Wozniak, 2017b). This has the potential to create major problems, as perceptions of self-legitimacy have been found to be crucial for effective police performance (Johnathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014). These perceptions, fueled in large part by how strongly individual officers identify with the organization, greatly dictate officer behavior; those with a weaker sense of self-legitimacy are more sensitive to provocations and more likely to use force, as opposed to officers who view the force and themselves as legitimate who express more support for procedurally just policing and the rights of suspects (Bradford & Quinton, 2014). Furthermore, a lack of self-legitimacy contributes to the high rates of personnel turnover and desertion experienced by these forces (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006; Pianin, 2014).

The question of how individual members of the police identify is important both because they occupy such a unique position in regard to the state and because developing a national identity is a fundamental necessity of the larger state reconstruction project. The tenuous loyalty of police is important not only for how this might affect their performance but also for the insights granted into the attempt to build a legitimate state. Police are not a random sampling of the population, but rather a group of persons who have chosen to align themselves with the state (albeit rather tenuously in many cases). If the state cannot successfully establish legitimacy with those who are paid to be its representatives and enforce its dictates, it seems highly unlikely that it will be able to sway the greater public to its side. Viewing the state as legitimate and the loyalty that builds within officers is something which needs to be a centerpiece of police reconstruction programs, rather than something that can simply be assumed.

One major reason as to why police recruits may not see the police force or the larger state as fully legitimate institutions stems from the fact that post-conflict police reconstruction programs are often centered upon the needs and desires of the sponsoring state, not those of the state under reconstruction. Police training programs have long been central to nation-building efforts led by the United States and other Western powers, as police serve “key political and ideological functions in providing the internal security and order deemed necessary for the implementation of liberal-capitalist development plans” (Kuzmarov, 2009: 193). Such police aid and training programs have long prioritized surveillance targeting subversives, with trainers and advisors ignoring abuses as long as economic and political interests were protected (Go, 2011; Kuzmarov, 2009). Thus, instead of instilling democratic police forces, these programs effectively serve to modernize the repressive apparatus in client states, a process which is readily observed in Iraq (Wozniak, 2017a), Afghanistan (Murray, 2011), Sierra Leone (Keen, 2005), and elsewhere (Ellison & Pino, 2012; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

This modernizing of the repressive apparatus takes place because reconstruction programs are often uncritically a part of larger programs designed to reshape these states into political and economic models which may be either not be desired or even strongly resisted by the people upon whom they’re being imposed. Many police reconstruction efforts have been central aspects of a “shock doctrine” (Klein, 2007) approach to imposing neoliberal reforms on recalcitrant nations (Wozniak, 2017a). Chief among the many problematic issues associated with the imposition of neoliberal reform regimes on rebuilding states is the central assumption of such programs that the state is inherently predatory and something to be strongly limited (Klein, 2007; Tannock, 2005). This impacts the police in a number of ways, both indirectly through the incitement of anger and distrust toward institutions and actors involved in these reconstruction programs, and directly through a lack of funding, personnel, and other necessities required for successful police reconstruction.

Contemporary Iraq serves as a powerful examples of the many problems inherent in such neoliberal restructuring in general, as well as its many deleterious effects on police reconstruction efforts specifically (Wozniak, 2017b). A central goal of the US and coalition forces leading the reconstruction of the Iraqi state was “sweeping simultaneous liberalization of labor and capital markets” (Yousif, 2006: 491). Iraq now has one of the most open and unregulated economies in the world, with its economic policies being described as representing the fulfillment of a “wish list” for international investors (Barbara, 2008). As such, there is no safety net for the large number of unemployed
Iraqis who are experiencing severe shortages of basic necessities, greatly fueling the lack of support for the nascent government and its representatives such as the police (Cockburn, 2014; Mutitt, 2012; National Democratic Institute, 2015; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Yousif, 2006).

Yet the classical neoliberal model of police reconstruction has much more direct effects on the possibility of the successful implementation of a democratic police force, as this aversion to state spending often leaves police woefully underfunded, and a long line of literature has demonstrated that the failure to properly fund and equip post-conflict police forces has disastrous consequences (Schwarz, 2005; Den Heyer, 2010; Wilson, 2012). Both Keen (2005) and Mueller (2003) report that declining state expenditures directly damaged the ability to maintain the loyalty of police in Sierra Leone. In Iraq, police face severe shortages of funding, with the government unable to consistently pay salaries or provide necessary equipment (Wozniak, 2017b), which has pushed police throughout the nation to engage in widespread extortion, bribery, and other extra-legal activities focused on self-enrichment (Cockburn, 2014; Pianin, 2014).

Beyond the obvious problems of widespread corruption, the often dire lack of funding and necessities for police forces undergoing reconstruction efforts is that cases from around the globe (Celador, 2005; Den Heyer, 2010; Wilson, 2012; Wozniak, 2017b) have demonstrated that such a lack of financial support leads to a persistent inability to recruit sufficient numbers of police “of adequate caliber and with relevant skills” (Wilson, 2012: 82). This not only affects the ability of police to perform basic policing functions, but very often these underfunded and underqualified police are tasked with not just providing crime control and public order, but also with responding to insurgent groups within the rebuilding nation. Asking such police to face off against groups which are often better trained and equipped results in “demoralized force whose members focus on protecting and enriching themselves” (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010: 87) and contributes directly to the high turnover rates discussed above. As such a central force for security and stability is undermined by these issues, it leaves a further weakened state with little ability to prevent a return of open violent conflict (Herbst, 2004; Nascimento, 2011).

3 | THE REFLEXIVE TURN

Moving beyond the classic model of police reconstruction, many scholars (Ellison & Pino, 2012; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Keen, 2005; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010) have instead argued for what can be termed a reflexive model (Wozniak, 2017b), or what is known as “fourth generation peacebuilding” in the International Relations literature (cf. Roberts, 2011). This view holds that police reconstruction must be context driven, with an emphasis on incorporating local knowledge and understandings. Arguing that the classic model’s guidelines are “unduly simplistic” and offer a “one-size-fits-all” approach (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007: 1097) that ignores important variables such as variations in forms of government and current levels of political violence, scholars instead argue that these efforts should emphasize “greater emancipation from structural violence, indigenous autonomy in determining peacebuilding priorities and the idea of the ‘everyday’ as a focal point” (Roberts, 2011: 2537).

Echoing Bayley’s (2006) guidelines, Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) propose a different four-point process which serves as a good summation of this new model of post-conflict police reconstruction. First, they argue that any attempt to create a new force must be preceded by a serious study of the setting through consultation of local populations and utilization of local expertise. Second, such efforts should be approached with a proper degree of reflexivity and humility about tasks and objectives, especially in light of how actions may be perceived and responded to locally. Third, reform efforts must be flexible and adaptive, deferring to local knowledge to develop appropriate measures. Finally, all involved must acknowledge the inherently political nature of policing and attempt institutional reform not simply limited to organizational improvement, but grounded in a broader set of democratic political relations.

Wiatrowski and Goldstone (2010) build on this perspective, arguing the goal of democratic police reform should be to “build a web of relationships between the community and the police” (80), facilitating crime control by making
police aware of the communities in which they are stationed, as well as building trust with citizens, which encourages their cooperation with the police. As a reconstructed nation continues to stabilize, the priority needs to shift from "police" to "policing" (Ellison, 2007), recognizing that holistic changes in police–community relations need to be made. Increased contact and cooperation not only increase citizen security but also are essential in establishing the public trust networks (Tilly, 2004) necessary for legitimate business activity, investments, and future planning essential for a stable, democratic state.

As part of this move toward a more holistic understanding of the wider changes necessary for democratic policing to thrive, there is a growing recognition of the need to incorporate gender into our understanding of necessary reforms (Meetens & Zambrano, 2010; Mobekk, 2010; Niner, 2011). Although often lumped in as one of several dimensions of increasing diversity on reconstructed forces, recent research (Bacon, 2015) suggests that prioritizing gender equality greatly increases the chance such efforts will have long-term success. There is considerable evidence to suggest that ensuring the physical safety of women is essential to the ongoing viability of post-conflict states and that increasing gender diversity within police forces can promote democratic governance more broadly (Bjarner & Melander, 2011; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Moran, 2010). As Karim and Beardsley (2017) argue, increasing the participation of women in the post-conflict security sector can contribute to the dismantling of gendered power structures that contribute directly to violence against women, as well as playing a role in improving gender equality throughout the wider society.

This newly emerging reflexive model of police reconstruction represents a clear improvement over its classical neoliberal predecessor. Building upon ideas such as Goldsmith and Dinnen’s (2007) assertion that police reform has to be but one part of a much larger set of democratic political relations, scholars (Ellison, 2007; Roberts, 2011; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010) are recognizing that it is not enough to simply build new institutions and expect them to be functional or legitimate, as "overthrowing a dictatorship, however repressive or violent, is not enough to establish legitimacy for a reform process" (Yousif, 2006: 503). However, even with these positive developments, the existing literature on police reconstruction still suffers from a number of flaws, with surprisingly little attention paid to this important nexus of criminology and political science (Stucky, 2013).

As discussed above, there is significant evidence that a continual problem plaguing police reconstruction efforts is the lack of a serious commitment to providing proper levels of funding and other material necessities. Although there is growing recognition that economic needs must be part of reconstruction programs (Barbara, 2008; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Wennmann, 2009), this has not yet found its way into the literature on police reconstruction. Although scholars have established that funding and access to resources is a key component for insurgent groups which seek to overthrow or destabilize the state (Collier, Hoeffer, Collier, & Söderbom, 2004; Mehlum, Ove Moene, & Torvik, 2002; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011), these studies remain confined to rebel and terror organizations, with "no corresponding literature on, quite literally, the other side" (Herbst, 2004: 357), namely, that of police and other state security forces (Wozniak, 2017b).

This lack of attention to proper funding and resource levels is important not only for how it effects police loyalty and retention (Keen, 2005; Murray, 2011), but also because of how directly it effects police capacity and capabilities. As many observers have argued, the failure to fund the Iraqi police force at anywhere approaching necessary levels was likely an intentional policy choice to prevent the kinds of reflexive policies centered upon indigenous knowledge that the new model of police reform calls for (Klein, 2007; Mutitt, 2012; Schwarz, 2005; Wozniak, 2017b). Yet even if there are no ulterior motives in underfunding police reconstruction efforts, such monetary shortfalls still present a major problem.

For as Baker (2007) argues, there will nearly always be a time gap between dismantling a regime and its social control mechanisms and the introduction of new substitutes, and the resulting law enforcement vacuum will "be filled by non-state policing agencies that will only disappear when the state develops the capacity to cope with the problems" (378). These kinds of non-state policing agencies arising to fill these law enforcement gaps are often incredibly dangerous actors, such as the Islamic State in Iraq who have used the security vacuum in many parts of the nation to deliver the crime control and order Iraqi police cannot (Wennmann, 2009; Yousif, 2006). A quite similar process
occurred in Afghanistan, as the lack of protection from police, and often danger posed by the police themselves, was cited as a central reason for citizens tolerating Taliban activity in their area (Braithwaite & Wardak, 2013; Rubin, 2006; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). As Baker (2007) demonstrates, the difference between a successful and problematic reconstruction program can be highly dependent on timing; while Uganda was able to avoid extended problems through the expedited introduction of a new policing regime post-conflict, Sierra Leone was slow in rolling out a new force and was besotted with non-state violent actors filling that function.

These problems in implementation speak to a fundamental difficulty of police reform efforts, which are often marked by a wide gulf between what the reform process is designed to achieve in the abstract and what actually happens in implementation (Bayley, 2006). Even in cases generally regarded as successful, one can still see this gulf in action. As Charley and M’Cormack (2011) note, despite featuring many successes in their reform efforts, the police in Sierra Leone remain viewed as corrupt by many citizens. Similarly, the work of Ellison (2007) on the police reform process in Northern Ireland is especially instructive in this regard. Northern Ireland followed many of the proscriptions of the reflexive model and is widely regarded as one of the few instances where police reform has had a lasting impact, often invoked as a template for the establishment of democratic policing. Yet the process of creating and instilling these reforms “can only be described as torturous” (Ellison, 2007: 244), taking well over a decade for meaningful reforms to take hold, with the reforms which do exist remaining hampered by wider political constraints. As Ellison argues, the experience of police reform in Northern Ireland illustrates forcefully that “reforms need to take place across a range of sectors (not just that of the police) to have a sustainable impact” (2007: 265).

4 | CONCLUSION

There is a growing recognition on behalf of scholars and policy makers alike that “the public security apparatus is critical to domestic and regional stability, as well as to deeper democratization” (Call & Barnett, 1999: 47). However, in the search for best practices, both parties have often proceeded without asking for whom such policies are best (Rubin, 2006). The classical model most widely employed in practice is poorly designed to handle the myriad difficulties of state and institutional reconstruction, as it typically treats thorny political and social concerns as simple technical problems to be overcome through skill-building and new organizational practices (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Nascimento, 2011; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Roberts, 2011). This uncritically narrow view of the task of police reconstruction often has the result of delegitimizing the reform effort in the eyes of the very people it is supposed to be assisting (Barbara, 2008; Wozniak, 2017a; Yousif, 2006).

To overcome these issues, scholars have begun to coalesce around a newer, more reflexive model of police reconstruction which more seriously attempts to wrestle with the complex and multifaceted nature of state reconstruction and the importation of democratic norms (Ellison & Pino, 2012; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Richmond & Mitchell, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). As Ellison (2007) notes, a “willingness to conform to the principles of democratic policing in post-authoritarian and transitional states is important as an end in itself” (243), not simply to meet reform benchmarks of ending human rights abuses, providing certain levels of security and order and the like, but because effective and impartial policing is fundamental to the establishment and maintenance of democratic freedoms (Bradford et al., 2014; Jackson et al., 2014; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

However, although the field has greatly progressed in the past few decades, post-conflict police reconstruction remains an understudied area in need of development. While the majority of the literature places a high level of importance on the role of recruitment and training, the actual content of training remains woefully understudied, especially as it occurs in non-Western contexts (Bayley & Perito, 2010; Hills, 2014; Jackson et al., 2014; Wozniak, 2017a), and the literature on recruitment practices is virtually nonexistent (Haarr, 2005; Wilson, 2012). As such, there remain significant empirical and theoretical gaps in our understanding of how to best achieve successful police reconstruction programs.
Despite the growing attention paid to this vitally important subject, the field needs more studies on post-conflict and other police reconstruction paradigms to fill in the many gaps remaining in our collective knowledge. Specifically, the literature is in need of contributions of two types: first, longitudinal studies which will give us the ability to understand the long-term consequences of the various tactics and practices employed in such projects and how they impact the peoples, communities, and nations they are intended to assist. Second, following the exhortation of Jenkins et al. (2011), the field needs significantly more first-hand, bottom-up studies to actually witness what is happening in the training and reconstruction efforts, both within the police and in the wider community. As the world community continues to attempt the export of democratic norms and institutions around the globe, the understanding police reform and reconstruction, which comprise such a centrally important aspect of these efforts, will only continue to grow in importance.

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